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SURVEY OF SELECTED 2019  
TEXAS OIL AND GAS CASES AND STATUTES  
 
By: William D Farrar1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Texas courts and the legislature were quite active in 2019 
concerning oil and gas issues.  Texas courts decided many cases 
involving everything from deed interpretation to lease repudiation to 
farmout interpretation.  The Texas Supreme Court has granted several 
petitions for review from the courts of appeal. The legislature enacted 
or amended statutes concerning so called “royalty leases,” the Mineral 
Interest Pooling Act, and others.  The following are summaries of 
some selected cases and statutes that will be of interest to those 





 1. Professor (Adj.) of Oil & Gas Law and Advanced Oil & Gas Law, Baylor 
University School of Law and Board Certified in Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, Texas 
Board of Legal Specialization. 
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A. Oil and Gas Leases and Provisions 
 
1. Offset Well Clauses 
 
In Bell v. Chesapeake Energy Corp.2, the San Antonio Court 
of Appeals used strict contract construction maxims to interpret an 
“offset clause” in two oil and gas leases to require the lessee to pay 
compensatory royalties.  The relevant lease provisions generally 
provided that if an offset well were drilled by a third party within 330 
feet, or within 467 feet by the if the lessee had an economic interest in 
it, then the lessee was required to drill a well, release acreage or pay 
compensatory royalty.3  The lease defined the compensatory royalty 
as “an amount equal to the Royalty Share of Gross Proceeds of 
production from the Adjacent Well . . . .”4  
The lessee first argued that the offset well provisions were not 
triggered because the “reasonably prudent operator”  standard was 
implied in the offset clause,5  meaning even though a well was drilled 
within the prescribed distance, the well is not a “triggering well” 
unless it was causing substantial drainage and a reasonably prudent 
operator would drill a protection well.6  The court noted that the offset 
clauses expressly provided that a well drilled within the trigger 
distance was a “draining well,” thus there was no requirement for the 
lessor to prove substantial drainage, nor was there any language 
implying a reasonably prudent operator standard.7  The court held that 
the lessor “is not required to demonstrate anything other than the 
existence of an Adjacent Well within the Trigger Distances that has 
begun production” and thereafter the lessee must either drill, release 
acreage, or pay the compensatory royalty.8 
Secondly, the lessee argued that even if the offset clause were 
triggered, the compensatory royalty should be based on something less 
 
 2. See No. 04-18-00129-CV, 2019 WL 1139584, at *1 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (noting that the case was an accelerated appeal 
as a representative case of a class action). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at *2. 
 5. Id. at *5. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at *6. 
 8. Id. 
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than the “Gross Proceeds” from the adjacent well.9  The court framed 
the issue as “whether Gross Proceeds are from production from the 
entirety of a horizontal well, any part of which falls within the Trigger 
Distances, or production attributable only to those perforations (take 
points) that are within those Trigger Distances.”10 The court noted that 
lease offset clause expressly provided that the surface location of a 
horizontal well was the determinative location of a well rather than the 
“take points” or location of entry into the productive formation.11  In 
seeking to reduce the amount of the “Gross Proceeds” to which the 
royalty would be paid,  the lessee argued that the lease provision did 
not consider the “realities” of horizontal drilling.  However, the court 
noted that horizontal wells were discussed in the lease and held that 
the lessee may not now introduce extrinsic evidence of “realities” of 
horizontal drilling to “alter or contradict the unambiguous [l]ease 
language.”12  
The lessee’s argument was essentially “that calculating 
Compensatory Royalty according to the plain language of the Leases 
is a bad deal.”13 The court disagreed, noting that the lessee was a 
sophisticated industry player, represented by experienced counsel, and 
fully expected horizontal wells would be drilled.  Accordingly, the 
express language in the leases controlled requiring that the lessee pay 
the compensatory royalty on the gross production from the adjacent 
wells.14 
 
2. Royalty Payments and Post-Production Cost Deductions 
 
In Bluestone Nat. Res. II, LLC v. Randle, the Fort Worth Court 
of Appeals construed royalty payment clauses in an oil and gas lease 
to uphold the trial court’s determination that the lessee could not 
deduct post-production costs from the lessor’s royalty.15  The lease in 
 
 9. Id. at *5 
 10. Id. at *12. 
 11. Id. at *13 (The relevant lease language stated “. . . in the case of a Horizontal 
Well[,] distance will be measured from the surface location or the subsurface path 
of a horizontal drainbore, from its point of entry into the productive horizon to its 
terminus, whichever is closer”). 
 12. Id. at *14. 
 13. Id. at *15. 
 14. Id.  
 15. No. 02-18-00271-CV, 2019 WL 1716415, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.). 
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question was described by lessee’s counsel as a “Frankenstein’s 
Monster” with its parts “cobbled together from the parts bin of oil and 
gas lease provisions.”16  The lease had a printed portion with an 
Exhibit A attached as an addenda.  The printed portion of the lease 
contained a royalty clause that stated lessor’s royalty would be based 
on: 
 
the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so 
sold or used, provided that on gas sold by Lessee the 
market value shall not exceed the amount received by 
Lessee for such gas computed at the mouth of the well, 
and on gas sold at the well the royalty shall be one-
eighth of the amount realized by Lessee from such sale 
. . . .17  
 
Exhibit A provided that “it is understood and agreed by all the 
parties that the language on this Exhibit ‘A’ supersedes any provisions 
to the contrary in the printed lease hereof.”18  Exhibit A also included 
the following provision relating to royalty payments: 
 
LESSEE AGREES THAT all royalties accruing under 
this Lease (including those paid in kind) shall be 
without deduction, directly or indirectly, for the cost of 
producing, gathering, storing, separating, treating, 
dehydrating, compressing, processing, transporting, 
and otherwise making the oil, gas[,] and other 
products hereunder ready for sale or use. Lessee 
agrees to compute and pay royalties on the gross value 
received, including any reimbursements for severance 
taxes and production related costs.19  
 
The court noted that typically there are three issues to consider: 
(1) the fraction of royalty such as 1/4th or 1/8th; (2) the method of 
 
 16. Id. (In this author’s experience, this is fairly typical—leases many times are 
assembled with a printed form and various addenda attached modifying, or adding 
to, the printed form). 
 17. Id. at *2. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
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valuation, such as “market value” or “proceeds”; and  (3) the 
geographic location at which the value or proceeds is determined, such 
as “at the wellhead” or “at the point of sale.” Specifically, this case 
involves the last two.20  “Proceeds” or  “amount realized” is the 
amount the lessee actually receives from a sale, while “market value” 
requires payment of market price in the vicinity of the wellsite 
irrespective of actual sales price.21 Market value can be determined 
either through the “comparable sales method” or the “net-back 
method.”22  The comparable sales method uses other sales that are 
“comparable in time, quality, quantity, and availability of marketing 
outlets.”23 The “net-back” method, “which determines the prevailing 
market price at a given point and backs out the necessary, reasonable 
costs between that point and the wellhead.”24  
The court found that although the preprinted lease form called 
for valuation based on “market value at the well,” which necessarily 
allowed post-production cost deductions, Exhibit A to the lease 
provided for valuation based on proceeds received by lessee.25  The 
court pointed out that although identical proceeds language on Exhibit 
A had been held to be “mere surplusage” in Heritage Resources v. 
Nationsbank,26  However, the court enforced the proceeds valuation 
based on the Exhibit A language stating that Exhibit A controlled over 
the preprinted lease form in the event of any conflict. Accordingly, the 
lessee could not deduct post-production costs from the lessor’s 
royalty. 
 
3. Lease Repudiation by Lessor 
 
In Lona Hills Ranch, LLC v. Creative Oil and Gas Operating, 
LLC,27 the Austin Court of Appeals determined that the Texas Citizens 
 
 20. Id. at *4. See also Byron C. Keeling, In the New Era of Oil and Gas Royalty 
Accounting: Drafting a Royalty Clause That Actually Says What the Parties Intend 
It to Mean, 69 Baylor L. Rev. 516, 520–528 (2017). 
 21. Bluestone Nat. Res., 2019 WL 1716415, at *8–9. 
 22. Id. at *5. 
 23. Id. (quoting Heritage Res. v. Nations Bank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. 
1996)). 
 24. Id. (quoting Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d at 130). 
 25. Id. at *16. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 549 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019) (pet. granted). 
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Participation Act (“TCPA”)28 did not preclude the lessee from 
pursuing a breach of contract claim against the lessor for failure to 
comply with a “notice before litigation” clause in the lease. The lessor 
first filed a complaint at the Texas Railroad Commission based on lack 
of production, challenging the operator’s “good faith claim” of the 
right to continue to operate the lease.29  The Railroad Commission 
dismissed the complaint, finding the operator  had shown a good faith 
claim to continue to operate the well.30 The lessor did not appeal this 
decision but instead initiated litigation in the district court against the 
operator for trespass to try title and trespass based on allegations of 
lack of production.31   
The operator filed an answer and noted it was a contract 
operator only and owned no interest in the well or lease and filed 
counterclaims alleging the lessor had interfered with the sale of oil 
produced, wrongfully filed the Railroad Commission complaint, and 
breached the lease by failing to comply with the lease’s pre-suit notice 
requirements, which would have given the lessee an opportunity to 
cure.32  The lessee intervened in the suit and filed its own counterclaim 
against the lessor for breach of contract.33  The lessor filed a motion 
to dismiss both counterclaims under the TCPA.  The trial court never 
ruled on lessor’s motion, thus it was denied by operation of law and 
addressed for the first time on appeal.34 
The appellate court found that the lessor had met its prima 
facie standard for dismissal under the TCPA, but then analyzed the 
operator’s response to determine if it could prove each element of its 
breach of contract claims.35  The court determined that the trial court 
should have dismissed the operator’s counterclaim because, as a non-
party to the lease allegedly breached, the operator could never prove a 
breach of contract.36  With respect to the lessee’s counterclaim, the 
court found that the lessor had failed to establish grounds for dismissal 
because the notice before litigation clause in the lease was a 
 
 28. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001 (2018). 
 29. Lona Hills Ranch, 549 S.W.3d at 842. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 843. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 847. 
 36. Id. at 848. 
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contractual limitation on the lessor’s right to petition under the 
TCPA.37   
 
B. Mineral Ownership 
 
1. Executive Rights and Duties to Non-Executives 
 
In Tex. Outfitters, Ltd. v. Nicholson,38 the Texas Supreme 
Court held that an executive mineral owner breached its duty of utmost 
good faith in failing to execute a mineral lease.  Texas Outfitters, the 
owner of the surface estate, and a minority mineral interest also held 
the executive rights to 50% of the mineral estate.39  The other 50% of 
the mineral estate was owned by others.40  A lessee leased the 50% 
mineral interest owned by others and offered the same lease terms to 
Texas Outfitters for the remaining 50%.   
Texas Outfitters declined to lease, believing that lease bonus 
amounts might go even higher and to protect his hunting business, 
despite the non-executive owner’s desire that the lease be executed.41 
Thereafter, the non-executives requested a meeting with Texas 
Outfitters and proposed a resolution whereby they would purchase the 
executive rights to their mineral interest, forgive part of a seller-
financed note that Texas Outfitters owed them, and they would lease 
all their minerals.42  However, no deal was reached because the parties 
were unable to agree on the specific terms of surface restrictions. The 
non-executives filed suit against the executive for breaching the duty 
of utmost good faith and fair dealing for failing to enter into a lease.43   
At a bench trial, judgment was entered against the executive 
owner for $867,654.32, the amount of the bonus the non-executives 
would have received.44 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that 
“the evidence supports a finding that Texas Outfitters refused to 
execute the . . . lease based on its arbitrary and self-motivated refusal 
to permit any lease for the purpose of protecting its use of the  surface 
 
 37. Id.  
 38. 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 2019). 
 39. Id. at 649. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 650. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
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and to exact a benefit from the [non-executive] [e.g., the note 
reduction and deed restrictions] to their detriment.”45 
The Texas Supreme Court first reiterated the law regarding the 
executive’s duty to the non-executives:   
1. [T]he duty does not require an executive to 
subjugate his interests to those of the non-
executive; rather, the executive must ‘acquire for 
the non-executive every benefit that he exacts for 
himself.46 
2. An executive is not ‘wholly shielded from liability 
for inaction, i.e., failure to lease, noting that if an 
executive’s refusal to lease upon request ‘is 
arbitrary or motivated by self-interest to the non- 
executive’s detriment, the executive may have 
breached his duty.’47 
Applying these principles, the Court stated they “cannot be 
applied in a vacuum and must account for the fact that executives and 
non-executives often ‘do not share in all the same  
economic benefits that might be derived from a mineral 
lease,’”48  and “evaluating compliance with the executive duty is 
rarely straightforward and is heavily dependent on the facts and 
circumstances.”49  The Court then noted that the trial court had made 
numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law and its review on 
appeal was to determine if “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence 
exists to uphold the trial court’s judgment and the court of appeals 
affirmation in favor of the non-executive.50   
In affirming the judgments below, the Court noted that the 
executive owner knew that 50% of the minerals had already been 
leased to a lessee and “gambling” that a higher offer would come in 
from a different lessee was highly unlikely and gambled 
 
 45. Id. at 651–52. 
 46. Id. at 652 (quoting KCM Fin., LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. 
2015)). 
 47. Id. at 652 (quoting Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tex. 
2011)). 
 48. Id. at 652 (quoting KCM Fin., 457 S.W.3d at 82). 
 49. Id. at 653. 
 50. Id. at 653. 
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disproportionality with the non-executive’s interest as compared to the 
executive’s, and solely to benefit the executive’s surface estate.51 
 
2. Co-tenancy of the Mineral Estate 
 
In Cimarex Energy Co, v. Anadarko Pet. Co., the El Paso Court 
of Appeals held that one co-tenant’s production activities on land 
would not perpetuate another co-tenant’s oil and lease on an undivided 
interest in the same land.52  Cimarex owned a lease with a five-year 
primary term on an undivided 1/6th mineral interest in 440 acres.53  
Anadarko owned leases on the other 5/6ths mineral interest.  Anadarko 
also had the lease on an adjacent 200 acres.54  Anadarko drilled two 
wells on the 440 acres, both of which paid out and produced in paying 
quantities thereafter.55  Cimarex requested to participate in the costs 
of the development of the two wells, and Anadarko refused.56  
Anadarko then applied for a permit to drill a well on the 200-acre 
lease.57  The well’s location was too close to the 440 acres for a regular 
permit, thus Anadarko filed for a Rule 37 exception permit and 
notified Cimarex of the application.58  Cimarex failed to object to the 
permit application, and the permit was granted.  Anadarko thereafter 
drilled and completed a successful well.59  The lessors of the Cimarex 
lease then executed top leases covering the 1/6th interest to a third party 
that were then acquired by Anadarko.60  Thus, Anadarko held leases 
on 5/6th mineral interest and top leases on 1/6th mineral interest. 
After Anadarko failed to provide information on the wells or 
an accounting, Cimarex filed suit seeking an accounting for its 1/6th 
co-tenant share of the net profits for the wells located on the 440 acres.  
Additionally, Cimarex attempted to force pool some of the land 
covered by its lease at the Texas Railroad Commission into the well 
located on the adjacent 200 acres using the Mineral Interest Pooling 
 
 51. Id. at 657. 
 52. 574 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019). 
 53. Id. at 80–81. 
 54. Id. at 81. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 82. 
 57. Id. at 81–82. 
 58. Id. at 82. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
  
352  TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 6 
 
Act.61  Cimarex and Anadarko thereafter reached a settlement in which 
Anadarko agreed to pay Cimarex 1/6th of the net profits for the two 
wells located on the 440 acres and to provide income and expense data 
and payments of net profits on an ongoing basis.62  Cimarex paid its 
lessors their royalty on the production as well.63  Anadarko performed 
under the terms of the settlement agreement, but when the five-year 
primary term of the Cimarex lease ended, Anadarko stopped 
performing, claiming Cimarex’s leasehold interested had terminated 
because Cimarex had not established production on its lease to 
perpetuate the lease into the secondary term.64   
Cimarex then filed suit against Anadarko.65  Both parties filed 
motions for summary judgment.66  Anadarko defended its position and 
the superiority of its top leases on the basis that the Cimarex lease 
required Cimarex to establish production and that the activities of 
Anadarko, Cimarex’s co-tenant, were not sufficient to do so.67  
Cimarex argued that the lease only required production “on the lands 
covered by the lease.”  Their reasoning was that since Anadarko had 
established production on the same lands the lease was perpetuated 
and because Cimarex had paid royalties to its lessors, both they, and 
Anadarko as the top lessee standing in the same shoes, were equitably 
estopped from repudiating the Cimarex lease.68  The trial court 
disagreed, finding that the Cimarex lease had expired at the end of its 
five-year primary term and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was 
not applicable.69 
On appeal, the parties reasserted the same arguments as below.  
The court of appeals relied heavily on Hughes v. Cantwell,70 where the 
court held that a lessee of a lease covering a fractional co-tenant 
interest in minerals is required to undertake drilling activities and may 
not rely on the activities of its co-tenant.71  The court explained as its 
 
 61. Id. at 83. 
 62. Id. at 83–84. 
 63. Id. at 84. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 65. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 540 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1976) (writ ref’d. n.r.e.). 
 71. Id. at 90–93; Cimarex Energy Co. v. Andarko Petroleum, 574 S.W.3d 73 
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2019). 
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reasoning in Hughes that the lease stated in several places that the 
“lessee” was authorized or obligated to do certain things, such as pay 
delay rentals, pool the lease, pay royalties, thus the option to either 
drill a well or pay delay rentals was an option for Hughes.  Therefore, 
the fact that a co-tenant had commenced drilling operations did not 
keep the Hughes lease from terminating when Hughes elected not to 
pay delay rentals.72  The court further explained that in order to rely 
on a co-tenant’s activities, one must participate, actually or 
constructively, in paying their share of the drilling costs.73   
Following their opinion in Hughes, the court noted that the 
Cimarex lease likewise authorized or required the “lessee” to explore 
for and produce oil and gas; pay royalties; undertake reworking or new 
drilling operations; pool the lease; designate pooled units; assign the 
lease; use oil, gas and water from the land for operations; and finally, 
to remove its equipment after lease termination.74 Thus, reasoned the 
court, it is implied “that the lessors intended for Cimarex to be the one 
to cause production on the property in order to extend the lease into 
the secondary term.”75  
Cimarex next argued that it had paid royalties to the lessors 
based on Anadarko’s production, and “it would be inherently 
inconsistent to interpret the lease to require it to pay royalties on 
Anadarko’s production during the primary term, while not allowing 
Cimarex to rely on Anadarko’s production to keep the lease alive into 
the secondary term.”76  However, the court disagreed, stating that it 
was entirely possible that the lessors could have intended that royalties 
be paid on a co-tenants production during the primary term, but to 
require its lessee, Cimarex, to establish its own production to 
perpetuate the lease into the secondary term.77  Cimarex next argued 
that it would be bad public policy to hold that one co-tenant’s activities 
would not perpetuate another co-tenant’s lease and would discourage 
the leasing of minority mineral interests given that it is typically 
uneconomic for a minority co-tenant to undertake the financial risk of 
drilling a well.78  However, the court disagreed, observing that: 
 
 72. Cimarex Energy Co., 574 S.W.3d at 91. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 92. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 94. 
 77. Id. at 94–95. 
 78. Id. at 95. 
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Cimarex was aware of the laws relating to co-tenancy 
when it entered into the lease agreeing to take a 
minority interest… [and] Cimarex knowingly took the 
risk that other tenants on the land might refuse to agree 
to a joint operating agreement, and that it might be 
forced to, at some point, commence production on its 
own, as contemplated by the terms of the lease.79 
 
Cimarex next argued that its Settlement Agreement with 
Anadarko was a joint operating agreement, meaning Cimarex and 
Anadarko were jointly developing the lands, and the Cimarex lease 
was perpetuated by the efforts of both Cimarex and Anadarko.80  
Anadarko countered that the Settlement Agreement did nothing more 
than recognize Cimarex was entitled to its non-developing cotenant 
share of the net profits.81 The court agreed with Anadarko, pointing 
out that while no particular form of agreement is required to be a joint 
operating agreement, the hallmarks of an operating agreement are to 
share revenues, share expenses, allocate liabilities, designate an 
operator, and define the geographic area to which it applies.82  These 
attributes were juxtaposed to the Settlement Agreement, which merely 
recognized Cimarex as a 1/6th co-tenant entitled to a 1/6th co-tenant’s 
share of net income. The Settlement Agreement omitted any reference 
to joint development, responsibility of costs and liabilities, and indeed 
referenced Cimarex as a “non-participating cotenant,” as opposed to a 
“non-operator.”83  
Finally, Cimarex argued that its lessors, and Anadarko by 
virtue of the top lease, were equitably estopped from claiming 
Cimarex’s lease terminated because the lessors accepted royalties on 
Anadarko’s production during the primary term.  The court dispensed 
with this argument stating: “we have interpreted the habendum clause 
in the Cimarex lease to require Cimarex to pay royalties on any 
production on the land during the “paid-up” primary term of the lease, 
while requiring Cimarex to cause actual production on the subject 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 96. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 97. 
 83. Id.  
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property to extend the lease into the secondary term.”84  Finally, the 
court upheld the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Anadarko as 
a “prevailing party” under the attorney’s fee provision of the 
Settlement Agreement.85 The holding in the Cimarex case is a warning 
that when taking an oil and gas lease on a fractional interest, the lessee 
should include language in the lease that would recognize a co-
tenant’s operations or production for purposes of perpetuating the 
lease.  It is the author’s observation that this case is contrary to the 
assumption that a mineral lessee stands in the shoes of its lessor with 
respect to co-tenancy law, while honoring the general proposition that 
Texas jurisprudence over the years has tended to support those who 
are spending money, thereby incurring risk, to bring oil and gas to the 
surface, as opposed to those who passively rely on other’s efforts.  It 
will be interesting to see the result if petition is granted on this case. 
 
3. Consent to Assign Clauses 
 
In Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carizzo Oil & Gas, Inc.,86 the 
Texas Supreme Court found that Carrizo had an unqualified right to 
refuse to consent to Barrow-Shaver’s transfer of rights under a farmout 
agreement.  Carizzo held oil and gas leases on 22,000 acres that were 
about to expire.87  Prior to the farmout agreement being executed, the 
parties negotiated various drafts of the agreement, including the 
wording of the consent to assign clause that provided that consent 
could not be withheld unreasonably.  Testimony at trial stated that 
Carizzo refused to qualify the language in the agreement but had 
verbally promised it would consent in the event Barrow-Shaver ever 
wanted to assign its rights.88  The parties ultimately entered into the 
farmout agreement that contained the following clause:  
 
The rights provided to [Barrow-Shaver] under this 
Letter Agreement may not be assigned, subleased or 
 
 84. Id. at 100. 
 85. Id. at 101, 
 86. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carizzo Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 17-0332, 2019 WL 
2668317 (Tex. June 28, 2019). 
 87. Id. at *2. 
 88. Id. at *2–3. 
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otherwise transferred in whole or in part, without the 
express written consent of Carrizo.89   
 
Barrow-Shaver spent over $22,000,000 drilling an 
unsuccessful well on the lands covered by the farmout agreement.90  
Thereafter, a third party offered to purchase Barrow-Shaver’s interest 
in the farmout agreement for approximately $27,000,000.91  Barrow-
Shaver requested that Carizzo consent to the assignment of the 
farmout agreement to the third party.92  Carizzo refused to consent, 
instead offering to sell its interest in the leases to Barrow-Shaver for 
$5,000,000.93  Barrow-Shaver refused to purchase the farmout 
agreement, and the underlying leases expired worthless.94 
Barrow-Shaver sued Carizzo for breach of contract, fraud, and 
tortious interference with a contract.95  At trial, both parties agreed that 
the consent to assign clause was unambiguous,  but Barrow-Shaver 
also argued that the contract was silent on the bases that Carizzo could 
refuse to consent.96  The trial court refused to admit prior drafts of the 
farmout agreement in which Carizzo had deleted the phrase “which 
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.”97  Both parties proffered 
expert testimony on industry custom and usage, with respect to the 
standards governing when consent to assign can be withheld.  Barrow-
Shaver’s expert opined that a standard of good faith governed, and that 
the request for $5,000,000 was a breach of the farmout agreement.  
Carizzo’s expert opined that the clause was a “hard consent,” and 
Carizzo could refuse to consent for any reason.98  At trial, the jury 
found that Carizzo had breached the farmout agreement and awarded 
almost $28,000,000 damages and attorney’s fees to Barrow-Shaver.99  
Carizzo appealed, and the 12th Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 
the trial court erred in not allowing the prior drafts of the farmout 
agreement into evidence to show that Carizzo had bargained for “hard 
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consent.”100 The appellate court also held that the existence of a 
written contract vitiated any cause of action based on fraud, and since 
Carizzo had the right to withhold consent, there could be no tortious 
interference with contract.101  Barrow-Shaver petitioned to the Texas 
Supreme Court, which was granted. 
The Texas Supreme Court ultimately held that the farmout 
agreement was unambiguous, and neither the prior drafts of the 
agreement, nor industry custom and usage, were admissible.  In 
reaching this decision, the Court found that there was no breach of 
contract in refusing to consent because the plain wording of the 
agreement gave Carizzo the right to refuse to consent for any reason. 
The court held: 
 
The consent-to-assign provision plainly states that 
Barrow-Shaver cannot assign its rights unless it obtains 
Carrizo’s consent, which must be express and in 
writing. In other words, Carrizo has a right to consent 
to a proposed assignment, or not. The plain language 
of the provision imposes no obligation on Carrizo—it 
does not require Carrizo to consent when certain 
conditions are satisfied, require Carrizo to provide a 
reason for withholding consent, or subject Carrizo to 
any particular standard for withholding consent.102  
 
The majority found that there were no material terms in the 
consent to assign clause.  Therefore, there was no need to allow 
extrinsic evidence to explain “immaterial terms.”103  The Court also 
found that industry custom and usage were not admissible when the 
clause was otherwise unambiguous.104 
In response to Barrow-Shaver’s argument that a duty of good 
faith is imposed on Carizzo in its decision whether to consent or not, 
the Court held “this Court has been clear that absent a special 
relationship, parties to a contract have no duty to act in good faith.”105 
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 103. Id. at *7. 
 104. Id. at *26–37. 
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The court pointed out that in its view, a farmout agreement between 
sophisticated parties is not similar to the relationship between insurers 
and insureds with unequal bargaining power.106 Finally, the Court 
found no fraud cause of action was available to Barrow-Shaver 
because the direct language of the farmout agreement contradicted the 
alleged oral promise by Carizzo to consent if requested.107 
The dissenting opinion noted that industry custom and usage 
evidence are routinely admitted to explain an otherwise unambiguous 
contract, citing the classic example of a “baker’s dozen” not being a 
dozen but thirteen.108  Explaining further, the dissent noted “this Court 
has noted that a ‘thousand’ rabbits may mean 1,200; a ‘day’ may mean 
10 hours; and ‘4,000’ shingles may mean 4500,”109  and the majority 
holding “that trade custom and usage has no applicability to terms that 
are ‘not susceptible to more than one [meaning[] and [are] not industry 
or vocation specific” is manifestly wrong.”110 
It should be noted that a petition for rehearing has been filed 
in this case.  The holding in this case has potential impact beyond a 
farmout agreement, which was at issue in this case.  Many exploration 
agreements, oil and gas leases, pipeline easements, and others have 
consent to assign clauses.  It is the author’s experience that if a party 
wishes to withhold consent with unfettered discretion, the consent to 
assign clause should add a qualifier such as “may withhold consent in 
its sole discretion” or “may withhold consent for any reason,” and 
absent such qualifier, there should be a commercially valid reason for 
refusing to consent.  The take-a-way from this case is that the Texas 
Supreme Court has adopted a very non-industry specific reading of 
contracts—if the contract words appear in a dictionary, then one need 
not consult industry custom and trade usage.   
 
II. Statutory Changes 
 
A. “Royalty Leases” and Addition of Section 5.152 of the Texas 
Property Code 
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In recent years, there have been an increasing number of 
disputes arising over purported “royalty leases,” whereby a buyer 
purports to “lease” the royalty interest a party owns in lands that are 
already leased or under production.  The buyers of the purported 
“leases” argue that the fact that the instrument is entitled or written as 
a lease does not prevent its effectiveness to convey a term royalty 
interest or a defeasible fee.  Some of the bases of the dispute can be 
found in the class action suit entitled Danna Sue Bridges et al v. Ridge 
Natural Resources.111  The gist of the complaint is that mineral/royalty 
owners receive what appears at first glance to be a typical oil, gas, and 
mineral lease, and they assume it is on lands not currently leased, or is 
a “top lease.”  However, the buyer claims that the “lease” is actually a 
conveyance, usually of the grantor’s share of existing royalty in 
existing production from lands already under lease, rather than a lease 
on unproductive land that would require exploration efforts to 
perpetuate the lease.  Some of the “royalty leases” include arbitration 
clauses that require any disputes to be resolved through binding 
arbitration.112 
The Texas legislature added section 5.152 of the Texas 
Property Code, effective September 1, 2019, to require additional 
notices and requirements when attempting to acquire permanently, or 
for a term, the mineral interest or royalty interest a lessor has in an 
existing oil and gas lease.113 Among the requirements are that a notice 
in 14 point typeface stating: “THIS IS NOT AN OIL AND GAS 
LEASE. YOU ARE SELLING ALL OR A PORTION OF YOUR 
MINERAL OR ROYALTY INTERESTS IN (DESCRIPTION OF 
PROPERTY BEING CONVEYED)” must appear on each page of the 
lease and immediately above the signature line.114  If the notices are 
not included, the instrument is void, as opposed to voidable.115   
The new statute provides for the recovery of all oil and gas 
revenues paid to the purported lessee, costs, and attorney’s fees.116  
Finally, the statute is cumulative with other remedies, thus a 
 
 111. Class Action Complaint, Danna Sue Bridges et al v. Ridge Natural 
Resources, No. 7:18-cv-00134-DC, 2018 WL 10072188 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2018). 
 112. Ridge Nat. Res. v. Double Eagle Royalty, 564 S.W.3d 105, 116 (Tex. App.—
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complainant could, for example, also bring claims for common law 
fraud, statutory fraud, and others.117 
 
B. Mineral Interest Pooling Act Amendments 
 
The Texas legislature, effective September 1, 2019, amended 
the Mineral Interest Pooling Act to provide that a unit formed under 
the Act will dissolve two years after formation if no drilling occurs in 
the unit or surface location for the unit.118  The prior version of the 
statute required dissolution at the end of one year. 
 
C. Ownership of Fluid Oil & Gas Waste 
 
The Texas legislature, effective September 1, 2019, amended 
Texas Natural Resources  Code section 122.002 to provide that a 
person or entity that acquires fluid oil and gas waste for the purposes 
of treating it for further beneficial use, owns the fluid waste, absent 
“an oil or gas lease, a surface use agreement, a contract, a bill of sale, 
or another legally binding document to the contrary.”119  Presumably, 
the purpose of this amendment is to resolve a dispute between a 
surface owner, mineral owner, and lessee over who has the right to the 
fluid waste, which could be quite valuable given the scarcity of water 
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